In most popular crowdfunding platforms, a firm sets a revenue goal and posts a price for its product. 1 Individual contributors may choose whether or not to commit to buying the product at the posted price (an action we dub 'contribute'). Contributions are collected and the product is supplied only when the total contributions pledged exceed the revenue goal.
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We model a crowdfunding campaign as a one-shot game of incomplete information, denoted Γ(B, n, p, µ, τ ), played among a population of n potential contributors. The common value of the product, v, can be either one (with probability µ) or zero and each player receives a private binary signal which equals the true value with probability p > 1 2 . Conditional on the state, signals are distributed IID across players. Each player decides whether or not to buy the product at the posted price, τ , ('contribute'). If a player contributes and the total number of contributors exceeds the threshold, B, then her utility is v − τ , otherwise it is zero. Our model extends Arieli et al. [1] who study the symmetric case, where µ = 0.5, τ = 0.5.
The campaign plays a dual role: (1) to raise funds for product development;
(2) as a means to gauge the market's demand for a product. Therefore we examine two performance indices -a (market) participation Index which measures how well do campaigns attract contributors, and a correctness index which measures how well do campaigns support the high quality products while denying funds to the low quality ones.
Main findings
Existence and uniqueness of an equilibium: We focus our analysis on non-trivial equilibria, i.e, ones in which there is a positive probability that the good will be supplied. We show that in any crowdfunding game, there can be at most one non-trivial symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 2 Furthermore, for sufficiently large n, the existence of such an equilibrium is guaranteed.
Let τ l denote the maximal price a player with a low signal is willing to pay and τ h denote the corresponding price for a player with a high signal. We say that the campaign price is cheap whenever τ ≤ τ l , it is moderate whenever τ l < τ ≤ τ h , and it is expensive whenever τ > τ h . We summarize our results for each of the three price levels. Cheap prices: When the price is cheap, playing 'contribute' is a dominant strategy for all players. Therefore player actions are non-informative and the correctness index equals the prior µ. In addition as all players contribute, the campaign surely succeeds and the participation index equals 1.
Moderately prices: When the price is moderate, players who receive a high signal will surely contribute. Players with low signals will contribute with a positive probability only when the threshold is above (1−p)n. In these cases, there is a positive probability that the sum of contributions reaches the threshold even if most players received low signals. We find that the correctness index in large markets equals, θ (µ, p, τ ) = 1 − 1−p p 1−τ τ µ. Note that this expression is bounded away from one, yet, as the price is moderate, it is always greater than µ. Furthermore, the correctness index increases as prices (τ ) and signal quality (p) increase but decrease in the prior (µ). In addition, the asymptotic participation index equals R(µ, p, τ ) = µ(1 + 1−p p 1−τ τ ). Note that participation decreases in both signal quality (p) and price (τ ). While it is rather intuitive that higher prices decrease participation, we also find similar effect induced by better signals. Expensive prices: When the price is expensive and threshold is greater than (or equal to) (1 − p)n, the equilibrium and the index analysis coincide with the case of moderate prices. However, when the threshold is lower than (1 −p)n, players with high signals choose a mixed strategy while players with low signals opt-out with probability one. We find that the correctness index in large markets of expensively priced crowdfunding game is identical to that of moderately priced games. However, For some parameter values, 3 the participation index in large markets is R(µ, p, τ ) = µp +(1− µ)
. Note that it is increasing in p as now stronger signals increase the probability of contribution of the indifferent player, which, in this case is the one with the high signal.
Applicability of the results to small crowdfunding games: The theoretical findings above pertain to crowdfunding campaigns with large markets. We compute equilibrium outcomes for 'realistic' market size that is derived from empirical findings using field data. The computational part demonstrates the validity of the theory to such markets.
